Cognition

Humans comprehend language incrementally, updating the representation of sentence meaning with each incoming word. These updates are guided by the distance between each perceived word and prior expectations--the prediction error. The alignment between large language models (LLMs) and cortical activity inspires the hypothesis that the cortical computation of prediction error is Surface-based, driven by statistical patterns of word form co-occurrence. In contrast, psycholinguistic models propose that prediction error computation is Meaning-based, driven by word semantics. We used polysemic words with ambiguous semantics to distinguish these models: ambiguity would introduce uncertainty into meaning representations and hence the prediction error, if Meaning-based, but would not affect the prediction error, if Surface-based. We examined how ambiguity influenced prediction error signatures in self-paced reading times and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) neural responses during sentence processing. While an LLM-based proxy of prediction error robustly predicted reading times and neural responses to unambiguous words, it failed to predict either under ambiguity. That is, prediction error computation was altered by uncertainty in word meaning, which supports the Meaning-based model and corroborates the essential role of word meaning in predictive language processing. Our findings highlight an important limitation of LLMs as in silico models of the human language faculty.

We study how confidence in perceptual decisions depends on whether it is communicated verbally (e.g., "very likely") or numerically (e.g., "80% certainty"). We find that verbal expressions more reliably distinguish correct from incorrect choices than numerical reports, challenging the common assumption that numerical probabilities provide more precise representations of uncertainty. Additionally, in a dyadic decision-making task in which participants can revise their initial reports based on a partners choice and expressed confidence, verbal and numerical reports are equally effective in supporting accurate revisions of initial judgments. Together, these results underscore the effectiveness of verbal expressions as a means of conveying decision confidence.

The present study examined whether thematic reversal anomalies are processed similarly across subject and object experiencer constructions in Malayalam. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded as 30 first-language speakers of Malayalam read transitive sentences with the two types of experiencer verbs, in which the thematic role assignment for the preceding arguments was either correct or reverse. The reversal anomaly became apparent only at the position of the experiencer verb. A linear mixed-models analysis confirmed a biphasic N400-P600 effect at the verb for both verb types when the argument roles were reverse. Thus, our results suggest a uniform processing strategy for TRAs irrespective of the type of experiencer verb involved. However, the N400 amplitude was larger for the object experiencer verb compared to subject experiencer verbs. We suggest that the quantitative difference observed for object experiencer verbs is due to the inverse linking of grammatical function and thematic roles associated with these verbs. In other words, verb-specific linking properties modulate the processing of TRAs involving object experiencer verbs. We argue that this modulation occurs because the parser recalibrates cue weighting when the expected form-to-meaning mappings are overridden by the inverse linking properties of object experiencer verbs.

Understanding speech in noisy environments (SPIN) is an important everyday ability, and engaging in musical activities has been proposed as a factor that may support this ability. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying a potential musical advantage in SPIN perception remain unclear. Here we investigated whether musical sophistication is associated with better SPIN perception in a large population-based sample, and whether this relationship is mediated by auditory working memory (AWM), verbal working memory (VWM), or non-verbal intelligence. We recruited 203 participants and measured SPIN perception at both word and sentence levels. Musical sophistication was assessed using the Goldsmiths Musical Sophistication Index (Gold-MSI). AWM was measured using delayed matching of tone frequency or the modulation rate of amplitude modulated white noise, VWM was based on backward digit span task, and non-verbal intelligence used matrix reasoning. Mediation analyses revealed that AWM fully mediated the relationship between musical sophistication and SPIN perception, whereas VWM showed no mediation effect. Non-verbal intelligence showed a partial mediating effect. Additional control analyses using structural equation modelling revealed that the indirect effect through AWM remained significant after accounting for age, hearing thresholds, and non-verbal intelligence. Together, these findings suggest that individuals with greater musical sophistication demonstrate better daily life listening abilities, and that superior auditory working memory may be the key cognitive mechanism underlying this advantage.

The ability to evaluate ones own knowledge states is often studied using paradigms in which participants make a decision and subsequently report their confidence. This structure has motivated hierarchical models in which confidence arises from a metacognitive process, distinct from the decision process itself, that estimates the probability that the choice is correct (Meyniel et al., 2015; Pouget et al., 2016; Fleming and Daw, 2017). Here, we contrast this framework with an alternative based on an intentional architecture (Shadlen et al., 2008). In this account, choice and confidence are determined simultaneously through a multidimensional drift-diffusion process, where each dimension represents one choice-confidence combination (Ratcliff and Starns, 2009, 2013). Choice, response time, and confidence jointly emerge when one of these accumulators reaches a decision bound. To adjudicate between these accounts, we fit both models to behavioral data from two perceptual tasks: a random-dots motion discrimination task with incentivized confidence reports, and a luminance discrimination task without feedback or incentives. The integrated model provided a superior fit for the incentivized motion task, whereas the hierarchical model more accurately captured behavior in the un-incentivized luminance task. These results suggest that confidence does not rely on a single computational mechanism, but rather its implementation may adapt to the specific demands and structure of the task.

Confidence judgments play a critical role in guiding behavior by shaping information-seeking, learning, and decision strategies. These functions are most effective when confidence is well calibrated, that is, when subjective uncertainty aligns with the objective uncertainty in the presented evidence. Motivated by this, we investigated how people form confidence judgments from noisy samples of information, and whether they use statistically grounded strategies or rely on heuristics. Participants performed two categorization tasks, one with visual orientation stimuli and one with number stimuli. In each task, participants saw sequentially presented observations and made a decision about the generating category and simultaneously reported their confidence in that decision. We independently manipulated the number of observations and standard deviation of the sample to assess whether confidence reflected an integrated estimate of both sources of statistical uncertainty. Behaviorally, confidence and accuracy both increased with larger sample sizes and lower variability. Furthermore, confidence and accuracy were equivalent in samples matched for standard error, suggesting that participants relied on a statistically grounded strategy. Computational modeling further supported this interpretation: a model that scaled confidence according to the standard error of the sample mean provided the best fit to the data, outperforming more heuristic and Bayesian alternatives. This pattern generalized across the orientation and number tasks, suggesting a domain-general strategy for uncertainty estimation. Together, these findings demonstrate that people use structured, statistically grounded strategies to compute their confidence, supporting well-calibrated decision-making even in the absence of full Bayesian inference.

Pretend play is a hallmark behavior in childhood where children create nonliteral meanings. Empirical data supporting the role of social cognition and the decoupling from literality are still scarce during early development. We explored here how the comprehension of pretense affects the visual exploratory behavior of toddlers (n = 44) and adults (n = 65) when they were exposed to short video clips in which an actress performed either real actions (e.g., eating jelly) or pretend actions (e.g., pretending to eat with imaginary food), while varying the complexity of those actions. We analyzed participants exploration of the face in the videos as exploitation of social information. We showed that all observers paid more attention to the face in pretend scenarios than in real ones, measured as longer total looking time in adults and more fixations and revisits to the face in both age groups. We also found more gaze shifts (a measure of information sampling) between the face and the moving hand in the pretend videos in both age groups, mainly at the initial stages of the actions. Additionally, analyses of the scanpaths structure using gaze entropy showed less order in the exploration of pretend videos in both age groups, suggesting that pretense involved greater uncertainty and increased information seeking. The less structured trajectories were observed again mainly in complex pretend scenarios. Taken together, our gaze results indicate that from its developmental origins, the comprehension of pretense relies on social processes linked with information seeking and exploration. Significance StatementDevelopmental theories have long debated whether pretend games are born in conjunction with social capacities in the second year or become integrated later in life. Our study shows that, much like adults, toddlers visually explore pretend scenes gathering more social information and in a less structured manner compared to real-world scenarios, suggesting that the emerging capacity to play with the meaning of things is linked with that of thinking of other minds early in life.

Internal forward models predict the sensory consequences of motor commands; however, whether the anticipated availability of post-action feedback contributes to the precision of the action itself remains unknown. We manipulated the predictability of post-release visual occlusion in skilled basketball players. Participants performed three-point shots while wearing liquid-crystal shutter goggles. The study tested three conditions: a no-occlusion baseline, certain-occlusion condition in which players knew that their vision would be occluded at ball release in every trial, and random-occlusion condition in which they could not predict whether an occlusion would occur. Shooting accuracy declined in the certain-occlusion condition relative to the no-occlusion condition (49.2% vs 41.7%). The random-occlusion condition did not differ from the baseline (46.1%). Within the random condition, the accuracy in occluded trials were virtually identical to that in non-occluded trials (46.6% vs 46.2%), even though the immediate visual occlusion was the same as in the certain-occlusion condition. These results demonstrate that it is not the absence of post-action information per se that disrupts motor execution, but the prior certainty that action consequences will be unavailable. We interpret this finding as a prospective influence of anticipated consequence loss, whereby motor execution depends on whether the prediction-outcome loop remains closable.

Can we rescue a percept that would otherwise be processed non-consciously? While pre-stimulus alerting is known to facilitate conscious access, the effects of retro-cues remain ambiguous due to methodological confounds in existing literature. Specifically, most studies finding retro-cue benefits have relied on spatial features (such as lateralized targets or cues) which confound alerting with spatial selection. Our design addresses this gap by employing central visual targets and non-lateralized auditory cues, thereby isolating the temporal boost of phasic alerting from spatial orienting. Across four experiments, participants reported the presence and orientation of a central Gabor patch presented at near-threshold ([~]50% detection) or higher visibility ([~]75% detection) levels. An auditory alerting tone was presented prior, simultaneously or after the Gabor, at various short and long stimulus onset asynchronies, with both short and long temporal ranges. Results consistently showed that pre-stimulus and simultaneous cues significantly enhanced conscious perception, increasing both seen rates and (in some experiments) perceptual sensitivity. Crucially, the effectiveness of retro-cues strictly depended on stimulus visibility. While retro-cues provided no benefit under near-threshold conditions, an alerting cue presented 200 ms after target offset significantly increased the proportion of seen targets when target visibility was higher. This suggests that a sufficiently robust sensory trace can be retrospectively rescued or promoted into awareness by a late alerting boost, and that pure alerting retro-cues are able to modulate conscious perception even when no spatial features are involved. These findings demonstrate a decoupling of stimulus onset from the timing of conscious access, providing a behavioural platform to arbitrate between competing models of consciousness such as the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and the phenomenal/access distinction of consciousness.

Each individual person looks at natural scenes in their own unique way, resulting in a distinct perceptual experience of the world. However, little is known about why such differences in gaze emerge. Here, we test the hypothesis that idiosyncrasies in gaze behavior are predicted by inter-subject variations in internal models--expectations about how scenes typically look. In two experiments, we first characterized participants personal internal models by asking them to draw typical bathroom and kitchen scenes. Individual differences in these drawings were quantified using an objective deep learning pipeline and, in turn, related to individual differences in gaze behavior. In Experiment 1, where participants freely viewed a set of kitchen and bathroom photographs, inter-subject similarities in internal models did not predict inter-subject similarities in gaze. In Experiment 2, we encouraged strategic exploration through gaze-contingent viewing and a memory task. Here, inter-subject similarities in internal models predicted similarities in fixation frequency and the sequence in which different object categories were inspected. These findings suggest that the influence of internal models on visual exploration is stronger under increased sensory uncertainty and when expectation-guided sampling of the environment is encouraged. Together, our results provide new insights into how individual expectations shape gaze behavior and help explain why people differ in how they explore the visual world.

Pitch is a building block of speech and music, but the extent to which pitch perception is shared across cultures is unclear. Evidence from Western participants suggests that pitch perception relies on multiple representations. For instance, harmonic tones are easier to discriminate in noise than inharmonic tones despite comparable discrimination in quiet, suggesting that different representations are used in noise and quiet. We tested whether these effects are present cross-culturally, comparing participants from the US and a Bolivian Amazonian Indigenous community (Tsimane). Participants heard two-note melodies and reproduced the melody by singing. Tones were either harmonic or inharmonic and were presented in noise or quiet. Both groups exhibited two characteristics of pitch perception previously seen in US listeners: the direction of pitch changes could be reproduced with equal accuracy for harmonic and inharmonic tones in quiet but was better for harmonic than inharmonic tones in noise. However, replicating previous work, Tsimane vocal reproductions were much less likely to be related to the absolute pitch or chroma of the stimulus notes, differing from the tendency seen in Western participants to match pitch and/or chroma. Pitch and chroma matching behavior were more prominent in a subset of Tsimane whose responses to a demographic survey suggested greater integration with global and Bolivian markets and culture. The results demonstrate that the basic structure of pitch perception is shared across cultures despite other differences in pitch-related behavior that are plausibly driven by culture-specific experience.

Decisions based on evidence accumulated over time require rules governing when to end the accumulation process and commit to a choice. These rules control inherent trade-offs between decision speed and accuracy, which require careful balance to maximize quantities that depend on both like reward rate. We previously showed that, to maximize reward rate, normative decision rules adapt to changing task conditions (Barendregt et al., 2022). Here we used a novel task to examine whether and how people use adaptive rules for individual decisions under a variety of conditions, including changes in decision outcomes across trials and changes in evidence quality both across and within trials. We found that the participants tended to use rules that adjusted, at least partially, to predictable changes in task conditions to improve reward rate, consistent with a rationally bounded implementation of normative principles. These findings help inform our understanding of the extent and limits of flexible decision formation in the brain.

Human pointing is often used to test whether dogs extract object-specific information from human communicative cues. However, above-chance responses in standard object-choice tasks do not by themselves distinguish between a referential interpretation, in which the gesture identifies a specific target, and an attentional interpretation, in which it primarily biases behaviour toward a broader spatial region. We addressed this issue using an asymmetric six-cup arrangement designed to separate coarse side guidance from exact cup localisation more clearly than a symmetric multi-cup design. Performance in domestic dogs was analysed using three measures: the probability of reaching the correct side, the probability of choosing the correct cup overall, and the probability of choosing the correct cup conditional on having first reached the correct side. The principal comparison involved three matched trial classes: the symmetric 3-vs-3 condition, 2-vs-4 trials with the baited cup on the 2-cup side, and 2-vs-4 trials with the baited cup on the 4-cup side. Descriptively, pointing trials exceeded matched no-point control trials more clearly for side selection than for overall cup choice. The clearest condition effect was observed at the level of side guidance. Dogs were most likely to reach the correct side when the baited cup was located on the 4-cup side of the unequal arrangement. Mixed-effects models confirmed a reliable group effect for side accuracy, whereas overall cup accuracy showed only a weaker and less robust condition effect, and within-side localisation revealed no reliable group difference once condition-specific chance baselines were taken into account. A complementary generative model comparison converged on the same conclusion: a referential-only model fit poorly, an attention-only model captured most of the grouped outcome structure, and a combined model yielded only a modest improvement. Dog point-following is therefore best understood as a layered process dominated by attentional guidance, with only limited additional target-specific localisation.

Visual working memory (vWM) is often linked to conscious experience and visual imagery, but it is typically described as a system that stores separate, independent items. These assumptions are difficult to reconcile, given the unified nature of conscious experience. Here, we test the hypothesis that vWM relies on at least two distinct representations: an underlying, unconscious memory trace and a consciously accessible, integrated representation. A total of 216 participants performed a change-detection task, in which they rated their perceptual awareness of the memory display during the maintenance interval. Critically, we manipulated the statistical properties of the displays (average item size and size variability) to probe sensitivity to unified ensemble-level structure. Results revealed a dissociation between subjective and objective measures. Perceptual awareness increased for displays with larger, more variable items, whereas objective performance improved for displays with smaller, less variable items. Despite this difference, subjective awareness still predicted performance, and even incorrect responses showed consistent biases rather than random guesses. Importantly, individual differences in imagery vividness (VVIQ) were selectively associated with subjective awareness and estimation bias, but not with objective correctness. These precision biases were further shaped by display statistics, suggesting that multiple representations can guide behavior. Together, our findings support a reinterpretation of vWM performance in which task responses can draw on both unconscious and consciously accessible representations. One possible explanation for these behavioral patterns is that subjective experience reflects integrated, ensemble-like representations, while objective performance depends more strongly on item-specific information. Public significance statementsWorking memory allows us to temporarily hold and use information, and differences in this ability are closely linked to broader cognitive skills such as intelligence. This study shows that these differences may not depend only on how much information people can store, but also on how they experience it: some individuals appear to rely more on consciously accessible, image-like representations, especially when memory is uncertain or prone to error. By demonstrating that subjective experience and the vividness of imagery can shape behavior independently of objective accuracy, these findings suggest that how we use memory may be as important as how much we can store, with implications for understanding individual differences in cognition.

A central question in psycholinguistics in visual word recognition is whether morphologically complex words are obligatorily decomposed into stems and affixes during visual word recognition or whether whole- word access can occur when forms are frequent and familiar. The present study investigated how morphological complexity and lexical frequency jointly shape neural responses by leveraging Korean nominal inflection, whose transparent stem-suffix structure permits a clean dissociation between base (stem) frequency and surface (whole- word) frequency. Twenty-five native Korean speakers completed a rapid event-related fMRI lexical decision task involving simple and inflected nouns that varied parametrically in both frequency measures. Representational similarity analysis (RSA) revealed robust encoding of surface frequency--but not base frequency--in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) pars opercularis and supramarginal gyrus (SMG), with significantly stronger correlations for inflected than simple nouns. Univariate analyses converged with this result: surface frequency selectively increased activation for inflected nouns in inferior parietal regions, whereas base frequency showed no reliable effects in any ROI. These findings challenge models positing obligatory pre-lexical decomposition, instead supporting accounts in which morphological processing is shaped by post-lexical, usage-driven lexical statistics. Taken together, our findings shed light on a distributed perspective on morphological processing, suggesting that structural and statistical factors jointly constrain access to morphologically complex forms.

Aesthetic experiences in everyday life unfold under continuously changing visual input. Although these experiences clearly depend on the observer and context, they are partly explained by the visual features of the input. Here, we investigated how well a combination of visual features predicts dynamic aesthetic experiences during naturalistic and artistic movie watching. In two experiments, participants continuously rated the aesthetic appeal of either the nature documentary Home or the animated art-style movie Loving Vincent. We modeled moment-to-moment ratings using image-computable visual features extracted from each movie frame, including visual fluency, color and motion statistics, and symmetry. Linear models trained on these features reliably predicted aesthetic ratings for new movie parts, both within and across observers, pointing to shared perceptual influences on aesthetic experiences. Model comparisons showed that visual fluency and color-related features were most informative for predicting aesthetic experience in both movies. Critically, models trained on one movie could reliably predict aesthetic appeal ratings in the other movie, despite the movies remarkably different content and styles. Color features were most informative for cross-movie prediction. We conclude that visual features shape dynamic and naturalistic aesthetic experiences, and that the mapping of visual features onto aesthetic appeal is stable across observers and different movie content.

The willingness to exert cognitive effort is essential but is constrained by the subjective cost of effort. Although effortful tasks are often avoided, positive bias about ones own performance may help sustain engagement with cognitive demands. Here, participants completed an effort-based decision-making task and reported trial-by-trial predictions of their own performance, allowing us to quantify performance prediction error (PPE) as the discrepancy between subjective and objective accuracy. The results showed that PPE was predominantly positive and increased with effort level, indicating greater overestimation under higher cognitive demands. Using a computational model, we show that choices were best explained by a learning model in which rewarded trials accompanied by positive PPE decreased subsequent sensitivity to effort. A confidence-based control model did not provide a better account of choices, suggesting that this effect was better captured by positive performance bias than by confidence alone. Our findings provide a computational account of how biased self-evaluation may attenuate the subjective cost of cognitive effort and extend the positive bias literature to the task need for cognitive effort.

Response inhibition, the ability to suppress contextually inappropriate actions, is a cornerstone of cognitive control and is commonly assessed using paradigms such as the go/no-go task. However, traditional go/no-go paradigms rely on binary outcomes such as commission errors, which offer limited insight into the dynamic, graded behavioral adjustments underlying successful stopping. The present study developed a novel mouse-tracking go/no-go paradigm with a dynamic start to capture inhibitory processes during ongoing execution. Twenty-three healthy young adults completed the task in two sessions separated by approximately one week to evaluate the test-retest reliability of standard behavioral measures (error rates and reaction times), and three kinematic features: path length, mean velocity, and mean acceleration. Results revealed robust differences between go and no-go trials across all measures. Successful inhibition was characterized by significantly shorter path lengths and reduced mean velocity and acceleration compared to go trials. Critically, all measures demonstrated moderate-to-good test-retest reliability across sessions, with intraclass correlation coefficients ranging from .75 to .85 for go trials and from .59 to .83 for no-go trials. These findings establish construct validity and psychometric reliability of the current mouse-tracking go/no-go paradigm. The demonstrated stability of these measures provides the methodological foundation for their use in cross-sectional, longitudinal, and intervention research targeting inhibitory control.

Stored memories are useless unless they are available for retrieval. Thus, investigating different ways to modulate retrieval is crucial. Novelty has been extensively studied as a modulator of memory. In this study, we investigated whether exposure to a novel event, an innovative neuroscience lesson, can enhance memory retrieval and divergent thinking in high school students. Across three experiments, we assessed the timing and mechanisms underlying these effects. In experiment 1, we found that memory retrieval was enhanced when the novel lesson occurred immediately before a memory test, but not when it was presented one hour earlier. In experiment 2, we found that the same immediate novelty exposure improved divergent thinking performance. Finally, in experiment 3, we explored potential shared mechanisms using a competition protocol and revealed that novelty improved divergent thinking regardless of its timing relative to memory retrieval. However, memory retrieval benefited only when tested immediately before the divergent thinking task. These results suggest that novelty boosts both memory retrieval and divergent thinking, but through partially distinct mechanisms. Our findings demonstrate that a simple, real-world classroom intervention can effectively enhance key cognitive functions in students. Significance StatementStored memories are only valuable if they can be retrieved, and memory retrieval plays a key role in creative thinking. Here, we tested whether a simple, novel event, a neuroscience lesson, could enhance memory retrieval and creative thinking in a real-world classroom setting. We found that novelty improved both memory retrieval and divergent thinking, an aspect of creative thinking, when presented immediately before the task. Finally, we revealed a non-reciprocal competition effect between memory retrieval and divergent thinking. These findings highlight a practical, low-cost intervention to boost key cognitive functions in students, demonstrating that brief, well-timed novel experiences can support both learning and creative thinking in educational environments.

Confirmation bias impacts judgments and decisions across a range of domains including finance, policy and science. Here we examine whether explicitly labelling information as true or false disrupts a core underlying computational mechanism that can generate this pervasive bias - asymmetric learning. Human participants (Study 1: N=47; Study 2: N=57) completed a 2 alternative forced choice (2AFC) task previously used to test for the presence of confirmation bias. Participants made choices between pairs of options that could win or lose money and received either factual or counterfactual feedback after each choice. We introduced a key novel feature into the task - providing explicit cues that signalled to participants whether feedback they had seen was true (verified) or false (debunked). Learning in response to feedback was attenuated under false compared to true labels but was present under both. Fitting participants choices to computational models enabled us to examine how sensitivity to the feedback varied as a function of both the label (true/false) and confirmation (confirmatory/disconfirmatory). This revealed a distinct pattern of learning rates typical of confirmation bias (enhanced learning from positive prediction errors for chosen options and from negative prediction errors for unchosen options) in response to both true and false labels. The findings highlight how confirmation bias plays an important role in the effectiveness of interventions designed to verify true and/or debunk false claims. Verification is less likely to succeed when information disconfirms prior beliefs. Conversely, debunking false claims is unlikely to succeed when the information confirms ones prior beliefs.