Social responsibility is the crucial factor in adopting early vaccination plans

Early vaccination of the general population is a very crucial aspect in the successful mitigation of highly infectious diseases, as it is the case of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The perception of possible side-effects from early batches of vaccines, presumably under-tested, is often a hindering factor for people not in high-risk categories to optin for early vaccination. In this work, early vaccination is formulated under a game-theoretic view with preference ranking and expectation maximization, in order to explore the constraints and conditions under which individuals are keen to opt-in for getting vaccinated. Although simple preference ranking leads to purely non-cooperative / non-altruistic Nash equilibrium, stable cooperative strategies can emerge under simple constraints on the payoffs, specifically the individual cost from possible side-effects versus the collective gain for the community ( herd) when endorsing vaccination by default. Significance StatementO_LIIf the collective gain from community-scale vaccination is deemed even marginally greater than each individuals cost of possible side-effects, then the best strategy is to cooperate, i.e., every individual to opt-in for getting vaccinated. C_LIO_LIThis condition is independent from the probabilities of getting infected, with or without vaccination, and it is sufficient to lead to a stable cooperative Nash equilibrium. C_LIO_LIIn any lethal infectious disease like SARS-CoV-2 and less-than-lethal possible side-effects from the vaccine, for anyone that is susceptible plus one more in his/her own close environment, vaccination is the optimal strategy for all. C_LI