Modeling Strategic Interactions in Recreational Cannabis Legalization: An Evolutionary Game Approach to Market Dynamics

Background and AimsThe global shift toward cannabis legalization raises urgent policy challenges regarding the transition from illicit to regulated markets. This study constructs an evolutionary game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interactions between local governments and cannabis dealers under dynamic market conditions. MethodsThe model assumes two players: the government, which chooses between prohibition and legalization, and dealers, who choose between legal or illicit trading. Payoffs are determined by enforcement costs, tax revenues, public health expenditures, and market scale. The growth of legal and illegal markets is modeled using logistic and exponential functions, respectively. FindingsSimulations reveal convergence to a low-intensity mixed-strategy equilibrium where government reduces enforcement and dealers partially shift strategies. Under this equilibrium, minimal enforcement persists alongside a small but stable illegal market share. Sensitivity analysis shows that the decay rate of the illegal market and the expansion rate of the legal market significantly affect the speed of convergence, whereas tax rate changes exert limited influence. ConclusionsThe findings suggest that expanding legal market access and enhancing regulatory infrastructure are more effective than relying solely on punitive measures or tax increases. The proposed model offers policymakers a flexible tool to anticipate market responses under various cannabis legalization strategies. Beyond cannabis, the proposed framework can be generalized to other highly regulated industries undergoing formalization, such as alcohol, tobacco, or emerging digital economies.